BY MANY INDICATIONS , the behavior of average union wages in the early 1980s contrasts sharply with their behavior over most of the postwar period. During the 1970s the basic mechanisms of union wage determination were in many ways solidified: the average duration of labor agreements continued to increase as the reach of multiyear contracts was extended, and there was a substantial expansion in the number of formal cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) provisions; many large unions adhered to a policy of negotiating an annual improvement factor plus COLA despite the fact that the productivity trends that formed the original justification for the annual improvement factor had greatly deteriorated; and while there has always been considerable dispersion in the results of individual negotiations, wage dispersion within the union sector appeared to increase as labor agreements that included COLA clauses ultimately yielded higher pay increases than those that did not. In addition, average union wage increases consistently exceeded average nonunion wage increases during the 1970s, raising the union-nonunion wage differential to a historic high by the early 1980s.
186
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1984 
UNION AND NONUNION WAGE DEVELOPMENTS
By removing the effects of employment shifts among occupations and industries, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Employment Cost Index (ECI) provides a cleaner measure of wages and salaries and has the additional advantage of providing separate information on union and nonunion wage developments.4 These data reveal a more varied story of the recent deceleration and the role of unions in that deceleration. Normally, nonunion wages have led the wage deceleration and displayed greater cyclical variance, while union wages, reflecting the influence of long-term contracts in which the wage provisions for later years are negotiated long before the economic environment of the increases is known, have tended to lag the deceleration in nonunion wages and have had less cyclical variance. In contrast to the usual pattern, union wages led nonunion wages in the deceleration of the early 1980s. In both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors, union wage increases peaked in 1980, while nonunion wages continued to accelerate to a (lower) peak in 1981. Consistent with differences in union strength in the two sectors, overall wage increases in manufacturing peaked in 1980 with union wage increases and then began to decline despite the continued acceleration of nonunion wages, while increases in nonmanufacturing wages peaked in 1981 with nonunion wage increases.
The greater deceleration in 1982 and 1983 in manufacturing wages relative to nonmanufacturing appears to be entirely attributable to the relatively rapid deceleration of union manufacturing wages. (The deceleration of nonunion wages is essentially the same in each sector.) By 1983, wage increases in manufacturing were less for unionized workers than for nonunionized workers for the first time since 1969. It is more difficult to track the recent behavior of fringe benefits. Nevertheless, a comparison of the wage and salary data with the compensation data (not shown in the table) provided by the ECI indicates that outside of unionized manufacturing, the growth of fringe benefits has slowed less than the growth of wages.
The data in table 1 also reveal that recent union wage adjustments have only just begun to reverse the thirteen-year growth of the unionnonunion wage differential in manufacturing and have merely halted the recent growth of the differential in nonmanufacturing. Between 1969 and 1982, for example, the union-nonunion wage gap in manufacturing widened by 13.5 percentage points.5 It would take another decade of differences in union and nonunion wage growth of the size observed in 1983 to restore the relative union wage in manufacturing to its 1969 level. Similarly, in nonmanufacturing, it would take at least a decade of unionnonunion wage growth differences of the dimensions observed in the late 1970s to restore the union relative wage that existed at the beginning of 1980.
What is behind the unusually rapid recent deceleration in union wages? In an accounting sense, observed union wage behavior in any period reflects the weighted outcome of three components of union wages: (1) first-year wage changes negotiated in recent collective bargaining agreements, (2) deferred, fixed wage increases specified in contracts negotiated one or two years earlier, and (3) COLAs contingent upon the behavior of prices and the details of the negotiated formula that translates changes in consumer prices into wage adjustments. (The weights-the proportion of union workers receiving each type of increase-vary with the cycle of light and heavy bargaining years.)
The behavior of these three components is traditionally described in the following way. First-year negotiated wage changes are about as sensitive to unemployment as nonunion wage changes. However, the responsiveness of first-year increases is muted by the rigidities introduced by fixed, deferred increases. In addition, the combination of COLA clauses and adjustments to anticipated price increases built into fixed wage increases renders average union wages more responsive than nonunion wages to price changes.6 This behavior appears to have been altered somewhat in the early 1980s, but to understand how this occurred one must examine the three components of union wage adjustments. The ECI provides no information on these, but the BLS series on effective union wage adjustments does (see table 1). In the aggregate, this series parallels the ECI union wage change data but extends back to 1968 for the private sector. The 4.0 percent increase in 1983 was a historical low for the series.
The effective union wage change is decomposed into its three major components in table 2 wage component, which often moves counter to first-year increases and mutes the aggregate response of union wages. The drag on the flexibility of union wage adjustments created by deferred increases from prior settlements is evident in the unusually high contribution of prior settlements to total effective wage changes in years in which the latter drop sharply (1972, 1982 of new agreements increased between 1980 and 1981 (table 3) , the proportion of union workers receiving such increases declined by a proportionately larger amount, pulling down the overall contribution of first-year increases to effective wages (table 2) . Similarly, the increased contribution of deferred and COLA payments (where the percentage increase actually declined) was raised by the increased proportion of union workers receiving such payments. Therefore, union wages began to fall sooner (in relation to the rise in unemployment) in the recent recession than they had in past recessions largely because of the fortuitous timing of the bargaining cycle.
The 1982-83 deceleration in union wage gains differs from previous ones primarily in (1) the origin and extent of the decline in first-year wage increases and (2) the large drop in the COLA component. While concession bargaining played a role in each, the evidence suggests the results are unlikely to be durable.
FIRST-YEAR INCREASES
The dramatic deceleration of first-year union wage increases that initiated the fall in union wage increases in the early 1980s reflects both the spread of unprecedented concessions and a general moderation of negotiated pay increases in industries where concessions were not made. Both the extent and nature of wage concessions has changed since the bargaining at Chrysler in 1979. Not only has the number of wage concessions expanded considerably, but the alterations in union contracts have become more dramatic. While early concessions tended to establish wage deferrals, there was a movement toward wage freezes and even wage cuts in later negotiations. There has also been a substantial increase in deferral or diversion of COLA payments over the period, which will be discussed further below. The impact of these developments on first-year wage settlements can be seen in table 3.7 Wage decreases were essentially unheard of in major collective bargaining agreements until 1981. Two years later, a third of the workers in manufacturing covered by new agreements experienced wage reductions. Settlements in the steel, airline, and meatpacking industries during 7. In several instances, bargaining over concessions was initiated by reopening a labor contract before its scheduled expiration date. Since 1981, contracts resulting from such unscheduled reopenings have been treated as new agreements in the BLS data. supermarkets, and construction. The product market pressures experienced in these industries, with the exception of construction, are not fundamentally cyclical. During the 1970s, some of the industries came under increased pressure from international competition, a factor that was intensified in the early 1980s with the overvaluation of the dollar. In addition, deregulation reduced barriers to entry in the airlines and surface transportation. In the meatpacking industry, new nonunion plants with advanced technology challenged the markets of older, high-cost, unionized plants. Each of these developments would have placed unions in the affected industries under considerable pressure to proffer concessions that would reduce unit labor costs even in the absence of the recession. 1 The result of the uneven impact of product market pressures was that at a time when the median union worker in manufacturing was experiencing no change in wage, some workers were receiving first-year increases in excess of 10 percent (table 3). While the upper tail of the wage-change distribution seemed to collapse in 1982 as settlements in excess of 10 percent all but disappeared outside of construction, it nevertheless dropped less rapidly than the median, and the overall dispersion of wage changes increased. Of those receiving wage decreases in manufacturing (nonmanufacturing) in 1983, for example, the median decrease was -6.6 percent (-4.0 percent). On the other hand, for those receiving an increase, the median was 5.2 percent (5.8 percent).
The dispersion in union wage adjustments both recently and during the 1970s contradicts the view that a few key settlements are widely imitated throughout the economy. While some patterns persisted (even in granting concessions) where one would most expect to observe themamong firms competing in the same product markets-there were dropouts of the most severely afflicted firms from the historical pattern (such as Chrysler in the automobile industry), and effective patterns were further diminished by the adoption of profit-sharing plans (discussed below). In addition, the effective union wage change data confirms the earlier implication in the ECI data that the union wage deceleration is not uniform but has been concentrated in manufacturing. Effective union wage changes in that sector moved from 5.2 percent in 1982 to 2. percent in 1983 but only from 7.8 to 6.9 percent in services. Moreover, the continual increase in the union-nonunion wage differential during the 1970s indicates the limited influence of union agreements in the nonunion sector.
No parallel deceleration of wages and benefits is discernible in publicsector collective bargaining until 1983. Since 1979, the BLS has published data on wage and benefit changes in collective bargaining agreements covering at least 5,000 state and local government employees (about a quarter of all such workers covered by such agreements). Data on firstyear wage and compensation changes appear in table 4. There are no instances of wage reductions. There has been a gradual increase in the share of these workers receiving no change in wages or benefits, but this share remains well below that observed in the private sector.
One reason that the public sector had higher and less flexible wage changes than the private sector during the period is the fact that COLAs were eliminated from major public-sector labor agreements during the early 1980s in exchange for larger fixed-wage increases. In 1979 sixteen major agreements had COLAs, covering about a quarter of the workers in state and local government bargaining units with more than 5,000 workers. By the end of 1983 only one remained in effect (covering about 1 percent of the workers in such units).
Contingent Compensation
The deceleration of first-year wage adjustments in the early 1980s has been dramatic, but in large measure is more an extension than a break with past union wage behavior. As already noted, this part of union wages has always been sensitive to the economic environment, and if a system of fixed (noncontingent) wage changes is maintained, first-year wage increases in industries where concessions have been granted will in all likelihood accelerate if and when profitability is restored. It has been through contractual devices such as COLAs and annual improvement factors that union wages have resisted downward pressure, moved up with inflation, and grown relative to nonunion wages. And it is contractual alterations in the means by which union wages adjust to contingencies that hold the most promise for greater macroeconomic wage flexibility and a reduction in the union-nonunion wage gap. In this section, we examine the extent to which such alterations have occurred in recent concession bargaining.
While the most obvious structural adjustment to greater uncertainty is to negotiate more frequently, labor and management have generally abandoned this option during the postwar period on the grounds that negotiating costs, including the probability of strikes, rise with the frequency of negotiations. There has been no discernible tendency toward this option during the recent wave of concession negotiations. The average duration of major private-sector labor agreements negotiated in 1982 and 1983 was 31 and 32 months, respectively, only slightly below the peak of 33.4 months in 1979 and at about the average of the 1970s.
Within the regime of long-term labor agreements, the parties have generally adjusted to the future by a system of deferred noncontingent wage increases and COLAs providing wage payments dependent on the movement of a general price index. The drag imposed on general union money wage movements by these mechanisms was evident in data reviewed in the previous section. Thus, one of the more important questions for future union wage behavior is the extent to which concession bargaining has altered or found substitutes for COLAs and noncontingent deferred wage increases in the later years of long-term labor agreements.
COLA ADJUSTMENTS
The first section showed that after a decade of increase, there was a sharp decline in effective union wage increases attributable to COLAs. Here I examine whether this development was caused by changes in the tendency of unions and management to index part of compensation to general price movements, or was simply a byproduct of the general price deceleration.
In an accounting sense, the observed contribution of COLAs, wc, to total effective union wage changes has three components: (1) the proportion of union workers covered by COLAs, a, (2) the proportion of price change provided as compensation to workers covered by COLA formulas (degree of compensation), k, and ( appear in table 6. Although COLA coverage is extensive in several of these industries, the only substantial abandonment of COLAs that is discernible during the recent period of concession bargaining is in the airlines and in food stores. Whatever the pressures on recent collective bargaining, they have not led workers to give up the basic contractual provisions indexing wages to movements in the general price index. Instead, several unions have agreed to temporarily forgo or defer COLA payments, to reduce the frequency of review periods, or to divert some of the accrued payments to other purposes, such as maintenance of certain fringe benefits. In addition, there has been some tendency to lengthen the period between COLA reviews. Between 1981 and 1983, the share of indexed workers that had a COLA review scheduled during the year declined from 68 percent to 59 percent, but in 1984, 86 percent of the workers are scheduled for a review. Relative to the early 1980s, a higher proportion of COLA contracts provide for (less expensive) annual reviews and a lower proportion for quarterly or semiannual reviews, but these proportions are similar to those in effect in 1978. The impact of these largely temporary adjustments should be on the degree of compensation.
The degree of compensation (k in the equation above) is difficult to derive, since it reflects the different review periods established in different collective bargaining agreements as well as the specific characteristics of the COLA formula, such as floors and ceilings. As noted above, the compensation parameter is unlikely to be linear in prices. The BLS has published estimates of k based on the exact contractual COLA formulas in major collective bargaining agreements and the actual reference periods used in determining COLA payments since 1981 (table  5) . These data reflect only COLA provisions and therefore do not include compensation for price increases that may be embedded in fixed wage increases. By the early 1980s, COLAs compensated on average for about two-thirds of changes in the CPI. In 1983, however, the compensation provided by adjustments from COLA clauses dropped to little more than half of changes in the CPI. This change reflects the largely one-time alterations in COLA payments noted above as well as the possibly more permanent alterations in review periods and price movements that were too small to trigger COLA payments. The basic structure of most COLA formulas has not been altered substantially during the period of concession bargaining.
The evidence indicates that the deceleration in the COLA component of union wage adjustments in the early 1980s was initially and mainly a result of the deceleration of the CPI. Later, and of secondary importance, specific, one-time concessions achieved a temporary reduction in the degree of compensation provided by COLAs to workers in a few industries in extreme economic distress. Nevertheless, the pressures that have stimulated wage concessions have not significantly altered the contractual methods by which management and labor address future price uncertainty. COLA clauses have been eliminated from only a few major agreements in the private sector, and these changes have essentially been offset by the adoption of new COLA clauses in other bargaining relationships. Moreover, there has been little tendency to renegotiate the parameters of COLA formulas. Even in those industries in which the most substantial concessions have been negotiated, basic structural changes in COLAs have not usually been an element of the concession package. Therefore, there is little reason to expect that the role of COLAs in union wage determination will be substantially altered in the near future. 14 14. Whether there is a reduction in COLA coverage over the longer term depends on a difficult-to-forecast set of factors including uncertainty concerning expected inflation rates, the degree of unexpected inflation, the sensitivity of asset values to price changes, and the change in a firm's value added with respect to general price changes. See In recent years, several economists have noted the desirable macroeconomic properties of indexing compensation to some measure of firm performance and have suggested that an answer to stagflation is to be found in a revision of compensation systems.'5 Institutional arrangements with this character include indexing wages to output price, profit sharing, employee stock ownership plans, and the ultimate in such plans, employee ownership of the firm.
Such compensation arrangements are logically distinct from the worker participation or codetermination plans, common in many European countries, which provide for employee representation on supervisory boards and works councils; as will become apparent below, however, there are reasons to expect complementarities between performancebased compensation schemes and participation arrangements.
Compensation systems that link pay to the performance of the firm also have the potential for producing long-run productivity gains for the firm. With pay linked to the profitability of the firm, workers have a general incentive to increase effort, relax or abandon restrictive work rules, and take other actions that contribute to the efficiency of the firm. The strength of these incentives generally depends on the size of the organization and on the specific structure of the compensation system. One recurrent difficulty with actually realizing the potential gains is that performance-based compensation arrangements have important public-good characteristics, with a consequent potential for freerider behavior. As a result, some performance-based systems may significantly increase short-run wage flexibility without having much of an impact on the long-run efficiency of organizations.
American unions and management have been reluctant historically to index the compensation of union members to the fortunes of the firms that employ them, through profit sharing or stock ownership. 16 On the union side, such arrangements conflict with several traditional objectives. With interfirm variations in performance, for example, these compensation systems thwart the basic union goal of "taking the wage out of competition" and break whatever intra-and interunion wage patterns may have developed as part of an effort to secure this objective. Indexing to firm performance also creates more uncertainty over real income than does the more traditional indexation of compensation to a general price index. Unless the firm's performance is closely correlated with the general price index, a COLA will provide a greater degree of real wage insurance.
Faced with these uncertainties, the median union voter, whose preferences determine the nature of the labor contract that will be ratified, is unlikely to support performance-based compensation systems in normal times. Protected by seniority arrangements from layoffs during moderate cyclical fluctuations, the median union voter recognizes a fixed-wage policy for what it is-a fixed (nominal) income policy for all but the least senior workers. When major secular or cyclical economic developments result in plant closings and layoffs that threaten the employment and earnings of even the median voter, however, performance-based compensation arrangements that might mitigate expected income losses may be considered in a new light.
Developments in labor contracts during the early 1980s are consistent with this view of union decisionmaking. Various arrangements that index compensation to the fortunes of the firm have been a feature in the concession bargaining of the early 1980s. However, neither the indexing nor the wage concessions for which it is often a quid pro quo has been a general phenomenon. As the median-voter model would predict, To fund the profit-sharing pools, several recent agreements call for allocating a fraction of pretax profits above the MAR to a pool for distribution to workers. Some plans use a fixed fraction and others (such as UAW-Ford) use a tiered approach, in which the percentage of profits available for distribution to employees increases in steps with the profit rate earned by the company.
Other contracts take a "deferred entitlement" approach, in which the amount that may be returned to workers from profits is equal to the amount of their earlier wage concessions. Under this approach, taken in the agreement between the United Steelworkers and the WheelingPittsburgh Steel Corporation, wages forgone by workers are in effect "loaned" to the company. Workers receive a contractual right to the amount of their wage concession and are in effect placed in the position of preferred stockholders. The funds available for redistribution may be created by profits in excess of MAR, but the total available for profit sharing is limited by the amount of the initial concessions. While the arrangement may provide incentives for short-term gains in efficiency to hasten the time at which the concessions are returned, its long-term incentive effects are dubious.
Profit-sharing plans recently negotiated in the agricultural and construction equipment industry provide an open-ended fund. Indeed, the funding and the distribution are synonymous in these cases once a firm exceeds the MAR: workers receive a cents-per-hours-worked payment whose size depends on the firm's profit rate. (In a similar plan, pilots with Pan American World Airways will receive a 1 percent pay increase for every $20 million of operating profit earned after interest.) This variant is much like a straight bonus system.
The mechanism for distributing profit-sharing funds to individual workers in recent collective bargaining agreements typically calls for a guaranteed amount plus a variable payment. An interesting feature of some of these plans is the size of the guaranteed payment in the first year of the agreement. In the farm and construction equipment industries, for example, the guarantees are based on what the negotiated profitsharing plans would have yielded if they had been in effect during 1977-81. Profits during that period appear to be larger than are likely to occur in the first year of the current plan. Guarantees in the automobile industry plans do not appear to be as large. Nevertheless, at least for the first contract year, some negotiated profit-sharing plans appear to have little to do with indexing compensation to the current fortunes of the firm. The large guarantees convert them instead into another form of fixed annual improvement factor.
In agreements with a fixed rather than open-ended pool, eligible workers also receive a share of the pool that is equal to their share of hours paid or compensation received, depending on the plan. The exact mechanism used for this variable payment has implications for the wage structure and for the future pattern of support within the union for the profit-sharing arrangement. Consider a plan in which distribution is based solely on an individual's share of hours paid. 18 Different individuals 205 paid for the same number of hours will receive the same profit-sharing payment in absolute terms, regardless of their skill level or base rate. Like the historically common practice of negotiating equal absolute wage increases and structuring COLAs to provide equal cents-per-hour adjustments for price changes, this distribution mechanism tends to narrow wage differentials based on skill. Thus, the impact of the profitsharing arrangement is similar to that of the fixed wage increases that it supplants. It also runs counter to the efforts of some employers to widen wage differentials by skill in order to provide greater incentives for training. A second characteristic of a distribution mechanism based on a worker's share of total hours is that such incentive effects as exist will be strongest for relatively low skilled workers, for whom the profitsharing component of compensation is relatively large. By extension, free-rider responses would be relatively large among high-skilled workers. For the same reason, the rank and file of unions adopting profitsharing plans with this particular distribution mechanism are likely to be less unified about the desirability of retaining the arrangement in future negotiations. Indeed, the likelihood of retaining the practice will depend on the exact skill (wage) distribution of union members.
Consider instead a profit-sharing plan in which the fund is distributed according to an individual's pro rata share of total compensation. 19 For a given number of hours of work, each worker will receive a profitsharing payment in proportion to his or her wage rate and the profitsharing component of compensation will not operate to narrow the structure. In this instance, workers should have an equal stake in the profit-sharing plan regardless of skill level, and the prospects for its retention in the future should be higher.
Negotiated Profit Sharing Plans and Union Wage Flexibility. The profit-sharing arrangements that have been negotiated in several industries in recent years have the potential for increasing the responsiveness of union wages to the firm's performance. Nevertheless, several factors are likely to limit the effect of the plans on aggregate union wage flexibility.
First, the coverage of the plans, while much broader than only a few years ago, is limited to the short list of industries noted above, and within these industries, coverage is not complete. I estimate that about 650,000 A second limit on the plans' effect on wage flexibility is that, in industries where plans have been negotiated, it is not obvious that profit sharing will become a large component of compensation changes in an inflationary environment. As noted, there has been no tendency to abandon COLAs in recent years. While profit-sharing arrangements might mute union wage-push (a rare phenomenon in the past two decades) or the drag of union wages in a recession, price increases from other supply-side factors would continue to influence wages and the cost structure and could dominate profit sharing as an element of compensation.
Third, the guarantees that are built into the first year of several profitsharing plans limit the extent to which pay is indexed to firm performance. Insofar as the current guarantees are a "rebate" on large recent concessions, however, they may become a less important feature of the plans in subsequent negotiations.
Finally, the scope of future profit-sharing arrangements in industries where they have been negotiated is uncertain. American employers have traditionally resisted profit-sharing plans, except during periods of economic distress. Recently, however, at least one major employer, General Motors, has considered the possibility that profits would be the main basis for future compensation. On the other hand, the UAW, which for years has advocated profit sharing as an element of the compensation package that could "benefit our members and be a useful way to settle bargaining disputes about the probable financial experience of the company during the term of a collective bargaining agreement," has stressed that profit-sharing should not be viewed as a substitute for the traditional formula of a fixed annual improvement factor plus COLA.21 Employee Stock Ownership and Worker Participation. Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) also spread during concession bargaining in the early 1980s; stock ownership was offered by companies as a full or partial offset to money wage concessions, including forgone in the NLRA. This law establishes a basic right to concerted activity by employees; it seeks to guarantee that right (1) through election procedures by which unions may become the legal representative of workers in a particular bargaining unit and (2) through the prohibition of certain "unfair labor practices" by employers and unions that are believed to interfere with the objectives of the act. The NLRB, an independent regulatory agency, was established to oversee the election process and to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate charges of unfair labor practices brought by unions, employers, and individual workers.26 The NLRA does not cover employees in the public sector, where collective bargaining rights are instead specified in a crazy quilt of legislation passed by state and local governments and in a federal executive order.
Over the years, the NLRB has developed a rather elaborate system of rules to implement the act's requirements that employers not discriminate against workers on the basis of their union activities or sympathies, that neither party coerce individuals in their right to join or to refrain from joining a union, that both parties bargain in good faith, and so on. As a result, the regulatory requirements that have developed out of almost fifty years of NLRB rule making are an important consideration in union organizing campaigns, collective bargaining negotiations, work stoppage activities, and the representation of individual union members by their organizations.
The ubiquitous presence of the NLRB has also fostered the view that notwithstanding some of the shifts in the composition of employment noted above, alterations in the rights established under the act could significantly alter the relative bargaining power of labor and management. Consideration of this view leads to the larger question of the real impact of the NLRB's regulatory activity on behavior and bargaining outcomes, a topic on which serious research has begun only recently. Whatever the merits of the larger debate over regulatory impact, it is clear from an examination of the numbers that union fortunes in representation and decertification elections (which might be altered by changes in the NLRA or in the policy of the NLRB) play a relatively modest role in the general decline in union representation in the United States.
In fact, there is no single factor that accounts for the decline in 26. Organizationally, the board's Office of the General Counsel, which handles investigations and prosecutions, operates independently of the board, which rules on the merits of cases brought by the general counsel. unionization. To a certain extent, it reflects an apparent reduction in organizing activity by unions. The percent of nonunion labor involved in certification elections declined from about 3 percent in 1950 to less than 1 percent in 1980. Most of the decline occurred rather precipitously in the 1950s, but the decline continued at a slower rate through the 1970s. The effect of declining organizing activity during the period was reinforced by a fairly steady decline since 1950 in the union success rate in those elections that did occur. This observation is consistent with the view that increased employer resistance accounts for the decline in union fortunes, but it is also consistent with a selectivity process wherein unions first attempt to organize bargaining units in which their probability of success is highest (given employee attitudes toward union representation) and only later proceed to situations that offer a lower probability of success. As the cost per organizing effort rises over time, it is hardly surprising that the resources allocated to organizing activity declines. The fact that the percent of union workers involved in decertification elections also increased steadily during the 1970s has often been cited as a signal of the increasing difficulties faced by unions, but this appears to be a gross overinterpretation of the small numbers involved.27 bargaining agreements that most influence wage flexibility and the past growth of union relative wages. In particular, most contracts, including those with substantial first-year concessions, continue to include fixed deferred pay increases. In addition, neither the duration of contracts nor the prevalence of COLAs has changed in any lasting respect, and most of the reduced influence of COLAs on union wage changes in the early 1980s can be traced to the deceleration of prices.
Whether the union-nonunion wage differential will continue to drop below its recent historical high depends on the relationship between fixed, "annual-improvement-factor" increases and productivity growth. In some of the industries, future productivity growth will depend in part on the ultimate impact of changes in work rules negotiated in the early 1980s. Barring major changes in productivity trends, a sustained decline in the union relative wage will depend on the willingness of unions to share more of the risk of uncertain future productivity movements by trading profit sharing (or other compensation measures indexed to the firm's performance) for some portion of the traditional annual improvement factor. That is, while retaining traditional contract forms, unions might negotiate smaller fixed increases than in the past but add or expand upon profit-sharing (or related) provisions to handle uncertainty over future productivity, much the way COLAs now address uncertainty over future prices.
A major novelty of recent concession negotiations has indeed been an increased interest in indexing at least part of the compensation package to firm performance. To date the interest is limited to industries in economic distress, and whether the median union worker in these industries is willing to accept a riskier compensation scheme in exchange for greater job security in the long run is itself uncertain. Some of the plans include distributional formulas that may divide high-and lowskilled workers on the desirability of retaining the plans. Moreover, adoption of such arrangements by industries that do not share the distress seems unlikely. With job security well protected by seniority arrangements, the median union voter has little incentive to accept a compensation scheme that offers a less certain income scheme. Finally, structural features of some of the profit-sharing plans appear to mute the potential wage flexibility that could result from such compensation arrangements.
Comments and Discussion
Marvin H. Kosters: It is clear that widespread union wage concessions and contract renegotiations during the past few years were unusual developments in collective bargaining, and that these developments produced unusually small average union wage increases last year. It is much less clear, however, what these recent developments mean for future wage flexibility in the union sectors and at the macroeconomic level.
It is possible to make the case that little in the way of increased wage flexibility over the business cycle should be expected on the basis of developments we have seen so far. Bob Flanagan makes this case in his careful review of recent union wage trends, changes in provisions of contracts, and changes in the legal environment for collective bargaining. Although he makes the case well, his paper has not led me to modify my own somewhat different conclusion that I expressed in a recent paper on essentially the same subject. I want to explore why we have placed somewhat different interpretations on what recent developments suggest about long-term union wage flexibility.
There are several points on which we seem to agree. We have both, of course, looked at basically the same data. We agree that the union concessions were not exclusively attributable to cyclical forces. I also agree with Flanagan that the concessions took place in the context of little strike activity; that changes in labor law administration were probably not a significant factor; that contract duration has remained roughly unchanged; that new provisions in labor contracts will not, by themselves, introduce much more flexibility than previously; and that new provisions may not spread or even be retained over the longer term.
Where we differ is on what we mean by long-term union wage flexibility I disagree somewhat with Flanagan's view that recent experience is "in large measure more an extension than a break with past union wage behavior. " As evidence of a break with the past, I would point to several instances of renegotiation of contracts before they were scheduled to expire, agreement to give up or defer scheduled wage or benefit increases, readjustment of long-term contract formulas (at least temporarily), and an increased frequency of departure from common, industry-wide contract arrangements. Perhaps the most notable, and perhaps unexpected, break with past practices is the emergence of agreements providing differentially lower wages for newly hired workers. Increased attention is apparently being given to modification of work rules to reduce labor costs, and increased emphasis is being placed on cooperative labor-management efforts to seek mutually agreeable arrangements in areas where interests may diverge less sharply than on rates of pay. How significant or durable these departures are is uncertain, of course, but I have been impressed with the inventive ways in which bargaining practices have adapted to changes in the competitive environment. I see the timing and size of union wage concessions as influenced importantly by the recent long recession. But their occurrence is a fact I attribute mainly to the pressures of competition on union wage premiums, premiums that had been expanding during the 1970s. In other words, I see what happened in several major union labor markets as derivative of what happened to competition in product markets, mainly deregulation in transportation industries and stronger competition from international sources. I see prospects for union wage flexibility in the future as contingent, therefore, on what happens to competition in product markets and service markets. It seems to me that some of the adjustments that have occurred are only initial steps toward more realistic wage levels and that some of these adjustments are nowhere near completion. In the telephone communications area, for example, growing pressures for adjustment seem likely. In sectors affected by international trade, further adjustments will depend on our trade policies. Although the kind of union wage flexibility that I have in mind here is not, strictly speaking, increased flexibility over the business cycle, I would expect some cyclical pattern because pressures for adjustment will be more pronounced during recession.
I should concede, perhaps, that I am not satisfied that I can explain the rise in union wage premiums in several sectors during the 1970s; inertia in wage-setting formulas and practices may have been a factor. Also, I would not pretend to be able to specify precisely the size and pattern of normal, equilibrium union wage premiums; I am persuaded, however, that whatever such levels are, they were significantly exceeded in the recent past in several industries. Evidence pointing in this direction includes shrinking union shares in partially unionized industries and declining competitiveness in some very highly unionized activities. The introduction of differentially lower pay for newly hired workers in several instances, with employers apparently having no difficulty in attracting new workers at these lower pay levels, is also consistent with this view.
I am inclined to agree with Flanagan's view that there is little reason to expect increased wage flexibility over the business cycle as a result
